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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DA YID E. BEAN, Administrator of
the Estate of Alice A. M. Carlos,
Deceased, Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

ARCHIE T. CARLOS,
Defendant and Appellant,
\'ERA EMELINE H 0 L L I S T,
:MARY ALICE CARLOS and
GLENN GREEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10899

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion
to vacate a judgment based on an alleged stipulation
for settlement of a suit to set aside deeds of the appellants' deceased mother.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The trial court sustained the alleged stipulation
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal and an order directing
the trial court to try the case on its merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 7, 1952, Alice A. M. Carlos owned the
five parcels of real estate described in the complaint
( R. 1, 2) and on that date she went to the Barnes Bank
at Kaysville, Utah, and executed and deposited with
the bank deeds conveying real estate to each of her
four children, the defendants Archie T. Carlos, Vera
Emeline Hollist and Mary Alice Carlos, and a daughter, now deceased, named Harriet Mabel Carlos Green,
who during her lifetime, was the wife of the defendant,
Glenn Green, who succeeded to her property. For
convenience the parties will be referred to by their first
names. The August 4, 1965 transcript will be referred
to as (Tr. ____ ) and the April 19, 1966 transcript will
will be referred to as (Ap. Tr ..... ).
Two deeds were made to Archie covering farm
and pasture property (Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 4).
'Vith the deed to the farm property the following document, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, was attached:
" ( 90) Ninety days after my death and upo~
deposit of ($5,000) Five Thousand Dollars, this
Warrant Deed together with the Eleven (11)
Shares of Davis and Weber Counties Canal
Company water stock shall be delivered to Ar·
chie T. Carlos.
2

The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) thus
<leposited shall be given to Harriet Mabel Carlos
Green.
The Barnes llanking Company of Kaysville,
Utah is herewith authorized to make the above
stated distribution.
The 'Varranty ~eed mentioned above covers
38.50 acres of farm land in Section 30, Tmvn~hip 4 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Merid-

ian.

'Vitness the hand of said Isl Alice A. M. Carlos
Grantor, this 7th day of
Alice A. M. Carlos"
April A.D., 1952.
(Duly acknowledged)
A similar document was left with the deed covering
:26. l J acres of pasture land directing the delivery of
the deed upon payment of $1,550 to be distributed
to Mary, Harriet, Vera and two granddaughters, Norma and Gladys Carlos. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).
All of the deeds and other documents were placed
in an envelope marked "Carlos, Alice A. to family.
No payments until death." (See Pltf' s Ex. E.)
Mrs. Carlos died at Layton on March 12, 1959.
Archie paid to the bank the sum of $5,000 and received
the deed to the farm land, and paid $1,550 to the bank
and received the deed to the pasture land. The deed
to the farm land was recorded June 11, 1959, and
the deed to the pasture was recorded February 29, 1960.
On or about February 20, 1960 Archie's three sisters
named above executed and delivered to him a warranty
deed covering the pasture land. (Defts' Ex. 4). By
3

deed, dated Feb. 26, 1960, Archie sold the pasture
land to N oall Z. Tanner and wife. (Def ts' Ex. 5).
On or about March 1, 1960, the bank disbursed the
money which had been paid by Archie to his sisters
in accordance with the directions of Alice A ..M. Carlos,
contained in the documents referred to above.
In December of 1963, Norma Parker and Gladys
Fixel, granddaughters of Alice A. M. Carlos, filed
a petition for letters of administration of Alice's estate.
The petitioner prayed for the appointment of their attorney's brother and law partner, David E. Bean,
as administrator. The petition was granted. (See
Probate file No. 1722). The adminstrator filed this
suit to set aside the deeds, not only to Archie, but the
deeds to Vera, .Mary, and Harriet, claiming that the
deeds were not delivered during the lifetime of Alice
and were void. The attorney for the plaintiff was K
Roger Bean ( R. l-5) . Archie filed an answer denying
all of the allegations of the complaint except the allegation regarding the relationship of the parties. (R. 6).
One C. De Mont Judd Jr. represented Archie. Vera
filed a cross complaint against Archie claiming the
deeds to Archie were obtained by undue influence and
duress and were not delivered during Alice's lifetime
(R. 14, 16). Her attorney is K. Roger Bean, who also
represents the plaintiff. Answers were filed by Mary
and Glenn, who were represented by Milton J. Hess
and J. Duffy Palmer.
The trial of the case began on August 4, 1965, and
4
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the transcript of testimony is in evidence (Defts'
Ex. t). The transcript indicates that testimony was
iaken during the forenoon. After the noon recess the
following statements were made:
"THE COURT: I understand, from conference with counsel for the parties in chambers,
that the parties have agreed upon a settlement.
ls that correct?
MR. BEAN: This is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you wish to state the
terms of the settlement into the record?
MR. BEAN: We do, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You may proceed .
.MR. BEAN: If counsel will allow me, then
they can correct me if there are any additions
or changes.
It is agreed, Your Honor, among the parties
represented here, and other parties as will appear from the stipulation, that the present action
may be dismissed with prejudice; that Archie
T. Carlos will pay to the administrator the sum
of $5,000, within 30 days. If there's a problem
about raising that money, Your Honor, we'd
be agreeable to an extension, a reasonable extension.
That Mary Carlos and Vera Hollist will pay
to the administrator, from a joint bank account
in Barnes Banking Company, which we'll identify by account number in the written ~tipula
tion, the sum of $1,750 each; that all parhesTHE COURT: Is that the bank account referred to in .Mr. Blood's testimony-the savings
account?
5

:MR. BEAN: Yes, Your Honor. The one into which the proceeds were paid for Mabel.
THE COURT: Very well.
MR. PALMER: In that point, may we hare
the stipulation that the balance be released equally to Mary and Vera?
MR. BEAN: Yes. The balance in the account
after this payment, it is agreed, is the propert~'.
of Mary Carlos and Vera Hollist, equally.
All parties quitclaim any interest in that same
bank account to Mary and Vera. And it is stipulated that Glenn Green also quitclaim any interest in that same bank account, and agrees to
quitclaim to Arch Carlos any interest in the
lot which was deeded to Mabel, and that he also
waives any right to any proceeds from the estate.
It is agreed that the administrator will issue
appropriate deeds to clear title to the 38.5 acre
tract to Archie T. Carlos, to the lot which .Mary
owns and occupies as record owner now, to
her, to the lot which Vera owns and occupies,
to Vera, and to the lot which was deeded to
~1abel, to Arch.
It is agreed that then from the 38.5 acre tract
Arch will deed to Mary a parcel running the
width of her existing parcel, and running westward from the back of her existing parcel to a
point one foot west of the existing sheds.
Mr. Palmer. is that the best way to state that?
MR. PALMER: I think so.
MR. BEAN: All right.
:MR. JUDD: That would be by quitclaim, I
think, counsel. Is that correct?

6

MR. BEAN: By quitclaim. I'm sure that
would be agreeable. Perhaps we should ask Mr.
Palmer.
Is that all right?
MA.PALMER: I think that's all right. And
get a deed also in order that there will be no
encumbrance on the administrator's deed from
the administrator.
MR. BEAN: All right.
Well, he'll already have that.
MR. JUDD: Arch received that.
(Inaudible discussion.)
MR. BEAN: It is agreed that Archie and
Mary waive any proceeds to estate property or
assets, and that the division of the estate property or assets shall be as has been agreed between Mrs. Norma Parker and Mrs. Gladys
Fixel and myself, on the one hand, and Mrs.
Vera Hollist on the other hand, and that they
shall be the sole recipients of the assets of the
estate.
And it is agreed that each party shall bear
his own costs.
MR. PALMER: It is so stipulated.
MR. JUDD: Mr. Bean to prepare the necessary documents.
MR. BEAN: It is stipulated that I will prepare the documents, th~ deeds, for the admi~is
trator, and of course wmd up the estate affairs.
I shouldn't have to prepare Arch's deed to
Mary, but I will, I guess.
7

lVIR. PAL.MER: I think that's noble of you .
.MR. JUDD: So stipulate, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is that your understanding,
.Mr. Palmer?
.MR. PAL.MER: It is, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The parties, several of the
parties are present.
You all understand that to be the stipulation
and the agreement for settlement?
.MR..JUDD: .Mr. Carlos, would you so state?
THE COURT: I note .Mr. David Bean has
entered the courtroom for the first time, and
who will be bound by this stipulation .
.MR. JUDD: .Mr. Carlos, would you state that
that is agreeable to you?
.MR. ARCHIE T. CARLOS: Well, on that
part about that silo, what am I going to do about
that?
.MR. PAL.MER: I have already cleared that
with him.
(Inaudible discussion.)
.MR. JUDD: You will have to move it if it's
on the property, but you can wait until it's able
to be moved .
.MR. PAL.MER: Sure.
l\1R. ARCHIE T. CARLOS: I don't go
much for that.
THE COURT: But you understand it to be
the agreement, even if you don't like it; is that
right?
8

MR. PALMER: You understand that.
l\IR. ARCHIE T. CARLOS: I guess.
(Further discussion off the record.)
MR. H.EAN: May it be stipulated further,
Your Honor, that we can withdraw the documents that have been put. in evidence, some of
which are original deeds and.MR. PALMER: I have no objection .
.MR. JUDD: I have no objection.
THE COURT: The exhibits, then, may be
withdrawn from evidence, if the parties withdrawing them will receipt for them.
The Court will approve the stipulation entered into between the parties, and at this time
would like to thank the parties and counsel for
their effort and for their success in reaching a
compromise settlement of this very difficult
problem.
I am sure of this: that a settlement does not
meet with everyone's complete satisfaction, and
that each party has had to make substantial
concessions in their thinking, and in their estate,
in their contribution toward this settlement, to
make it work. If you didn't have to make those
concessions, it wouldn't be a compromise settlement. And so each of you have had to make a
considerable concession in your thinking, and in
your contribution, financially and otherwise, to
make this settlement proper. But I am convinced of this: that it's a better solution to the
problem than the parties would have received
by continuing with the trial. This way, you do
have a tailor-made settlement that fits, in some
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manner, the needs of each and every one of you.
Had you continued with the trial, the result
could not have been on a basis anything like
this. It would have been an entirely different result, regardless what the result was.
But I do commend the parties and counsel
for their effort and help in this regard.
Court will be in recess."
(Thereupon the Court recessed.) (Tr. 43-48).
A written stipulation purporting to set out the
alleged stipulation in open court was prepared, signed
by David E. Bean and K. Roger Bean and presented
to Archie. He ref used to sign it. (See Deft. Ex. I
and Affidavit R. 42). A motion was filed by the administrator for entry of judgment in accordance with the
alleged stipulation made in open court. (R. 28). The
motion was noticed for hearing on November 13, 1965.
Under date of December 13, 1965 the court made findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment based
upon the alleged stipulation. (R. 30-37). Archie had
not heard of the entry of the judgment against him
for $5,000 until about February 6, 1966. (Ap. Tr.
p. 26).
On April 12, 1966 Archie filed a motion to vacate
the judgment dated December 13, 1965, upon the
grounds, among others, that (I) the judgment purports to be based upon the pleadings and that no pleadings support the judgment, ( 2) that there was no
stipulation for judgment actually made, and that no
order of the probate court authorized the action of the
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with the motion in which he stated that he had not
orally or in writing stipulated for the entry of judgment for $5,000 and that after the partial trial of
the case he refused to sign the written stipulation and
communicated it to his attorney Mr. Judd. (R. 42).

At the hearing on the motion to vacate the judgment, Archie testified that on the day of the trial he
understood that :Mr. Bean had asked for $5,000 more
than the $5,000 he had theretofore paid, that he told
his attorney Mr. Judd that he wouldn't pay it and
that he had not authorized him to settle the case. He
further testified as follows:
"Q. Do you know what a stipulation is, Mr.
Carlos'?

A. Never heard of it. First time I've ever been
court." (Ap. Tr. p. 5).
He further testified that he did not understand
provisions of the alleged stipulation regarding waiving
his claims against the estate:
"Q. Now, Mr. Carlos, do you recall anything
being said in open court here, or in a written
stipulation that was submitted, regarding
your waiving any claims against the estate?

A. 'Vell, none that I know of. Any more i:han
- I don't hardly get your question.
Q. Well, did you understand that if a stipulation were made in the form that was discussed in court, that you would have no right
11

to receive anything on your claim agains!
the estate?
A. Well, I didn't understand it that way. I-I
haven't got too good an education, and I-

Q. How much education have you had?

A. I have a Fifth Grade education. I was
taken out of school when I was 14 years old,
and been on the farm. I've never missed a
year that I haven't farmed this ground since
1914.

Q. I think you testified that you'd never been
in court before that day.

A. I never." (Ap. Tr. pp. 26, 27).
Mrs. Archie Carlos testified that she had met with
her husband and Mr. Judd in the Jury room on August
4, 1965, that she heard all the conversation at that time.
"Q. I will ask you whether you made, or heard
Mr. Carlos make any statement authorizing
settlement of this case.

A. He did not. He said, 'I won't pay for it.'"
(Ap. Tr. p. 30).
On cross-examinaton she was asked why she didn't
stand up and say something at the trial and she said
she was afraid to, "We were both afraid to." (Ap. Tr.
p. 31).
Mr. Carlos and his wife were cross-examined. No
evidence was introduced by the opposing parties and
the testimony referred to above is uncontradicted.
The court denied the motion and made findings
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to the effect that Archie knew a settlement was made
and that he authorized his attorney to participate in reducing the settlement to a formal stipulation in open
court and to the further effect that the probate court had
both authorized and directed the prosecution of the suit.
(Ap. Tr. pp. 45-47). Archie appealed from the order.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. There was no stipulation for judgment.
2. The alleged stipulation was not valid because it

was not authorized or approved by the probate court.
3. The judgment is void.

4. The findings and order are not supported by

any competent evidence.

ARGUMENT
1. THERE WAS NO STIPULATION FOR

JUDGMENT.
The argument in support of this point will be
divided as follows:
( 1) Archie did not personally stipulate to the entry

of judgment against him, nor did he authorize his
attorney to so stipulate, ( 2) The parties intended the
stipulation stated generally to be reduced to writing
and signed before it become effective, (3) Archie
13

withdrew auy consent to the judgment before it was
signed and ( 4) The judgment went beyond the scope
of the alleged stipulation.
(I) The record of the stipulation in open court
which is reproduced verbatim in this brief should properly be considered in the light of Archie's knowledge
and experience. He testified that he had nerer
been in court before, and that he did not know what
the word "stipulation" meant, (Ap. Tr. 5) and
that he had had only a fifth grade education. ( Ap.
Tr. p. 2{)). It will be noted that the proposed stipulation was presented in "lawyer's language" in general terms, and when the court asked Archie whether
he agreed to it he said, "'Veil on that part about that
silo, what am I going to do about that?" (Tr. p. 4{i).
His only other comments were, "I don't go much for
that", and "I guess", which from the context clearly
referred to the discussion about the silo. (Tr. p. 47).
At the hearing on the motion to vacate the judgment,
Archie said, ""Tell, I didn't know it had been settled."
(Ap. Tr. p. 4).
A careful reading of the transcript reproduced m
this brief will not disclosed a stated agreement to
the proposal by either Mr. Judd or by Archie. Mr.
Judd asked Archie to state that he stipulated and
Archie aYoided the question by mentioning the silo and
then he said, "I guess." (Tr. 46, 47).

The law is well settled that a stipulation for a
judgment must meet very exacting standards of clarity
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so that it is certain that the parties had an understanding of what they were doing. The rule is stated as
follows:
"The consent should be so clear and specific
in terms that no mistake can arise as to the concurrence of the parties." 49 C.J.S. p. 312.
Testimony taken in support of the motion to vacate
the judgment indicates clearly that Archie did not
authorize his attorney to stipulate for judgment against
him. He said in so many words that he did not authorize his attorney to so stipulate. (Ap. Tr. p. 5). Mrs.
Carlos when testifying about a meeting in the Jury
room with their counsel said that her husband told his
attorney, "I won't pay it." (Ap. Tr. p. 30). This testimony is the only testimony in the record and it stands
uucontradicted.
( 2) 'i\Then the stipulation was stated into the record it is clear that the parties intended to reduce it to
written form as a basis for a judgment. "\Ve quote:
"That Mary Carlos and Vera Hollist will pay
to the administrator from a joint bank account
in Barnes Banking Company, which we will
identify by account number in the written stipulation, the sum of $1750.00 each . . . " (Emphasis added). (Tr. 44).
A stipulation was actually prepared and Archie
ref used to sign it. See affidavit attached to the motion
to vacate ( R. ·1<2) and also the unsigned stipulation.
(Deft. Ex. 1). This clearly shows the intention at the
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time the stipulation was made in open court that it
was preliminary, and not intended to be effective until
signed by the parties.
( 3) If we assume only for the sake of argument

that Archie stipulated for judgment, then his refusal
to sign the written stipulation which was presented constituted a withdrawal of his consent to the entry of
judgment. The law is clear that consent to a stipulated
judgment may be withdrawn at any time prior to the
entry of judgment.
llurneman v. Heaton (Texas) 240 S.\V. 2d

288

Lee v. Rhodes, 227 N.C. 240, 41 S.E. 2d 747
Rodriquez v. Rodriquez, 224 N.C. 27.5, 29
S.E. 2d 901
Jacobs v. Steinbrink, 273 N.Y.S. 498, 242
App. Div 197
49 C.J.S. p. 312

In Jacobs v. Steinbrink, supra, the court said:
"The entry of judgment as the result of 'con·
ciliation' rests on consent alone, and that con·
sent obtains at the time of the entry of the judg·
ment. It may be withdrawn at any time prior
to the entry of judgment, and it has been with·
drawn in this case."
In the Burneman case cited above the court held
that a judgment based upon a withdrawn consent was
absolutely void.
16

At the time the judgment was signed the respondeuts and the court knew that Archie had withdrawn
whatever consent he had given, which we sincerely
contend was no consent. See the motion (R. 28) filed
November 15, 1965, which recites Archie's refusal to
sign and return the stipulation.
( 4) The judgment went beyond the scope of the
alleged stipulation in open court, as did also the
stipulation in writing which Archie refused to sign.
Paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 respecting the quieting of title
and transfer of property to Mary are not covered in
the alleged stipulation in open court. It was stated
in open court that the adrillnistrator would issue deeds
to clear title to the lands of Mary, Vera and Archie.
(Tr. 44).

It could have been properly assumed by Archie
that the execution of the deeds by the administrator
would be authorized by the probate court after petition and hearing, which would have cleared his title
as against the claims of the estate. Instead the court
entered a judgment purporting to quiet Archie's title
and to distribute the estate which went beyond the
pleadings and the jurisdiction of the court. The argument as to the action of the court in excess of its jurisdiction appears under another heading. The judgment contains a detailed description of certain land
which it purports to transfer by order of the court
from Archie to Mary. Archie has been married since
1928 and his wife is not a party to the suit. Also, there
is no agreement to the description. (Tr. 43-47).
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There is nothing in the stipulation which indicates
that the judgment would constitute a settlement of
the estate of Alice A. M. Carlos and that all assets
of the estate regardless of valid claims filed would
go to Gladys Fixel, Norma Parker, and Vera Hollis!.
The statement in court was that the assets of the estate
would be divided as has been agreed between Mrs.
Norma Parker and Mrs. Gladys Fixel and myself
(Mr. Bean) on the one hand and Vera Emeline Hollist
on the other and that they would be the sole recipients
of the assets of the estate. The terrns and nature of
the agreement referred to was not disclosed in court.
The judgment states that Archie, Mary and Glenn
agree that the property of the estate may be distributed
to Norma Paarker, Gladys Fixel and Vera Emeline
Hollist. Neither Norma Parker nor Gladys .Fixel are
parties to this suit or to the stipulation. There is nothing
in the stipulation or judgment which would protect
Archie against them.
Archie did not agree to the provisions of the judgment, and this is a case of the court, at the obvious
insistance of the attorneys and parties pressing for a
settlement, making an agreement for the parties, in·
effectunl as it may be to clear the title.
It is settled law that a judgment must conform
to the terms agreed upon by the parties and that the
court has no power to add conditions or provisions
on which the parties have not agreed.

18

49 C.J.S. 314 - Notes 38 and 39
Edwards v.Gifford,137 Texas 559, 155 S.W. 2d
786; People's Ditch Co. v. Fresno Canal and Irr.
Co., 152 Cal. 87, 92 P. 77; Posey v. Abraham,
165 Okl. 140, 25 P.2d 287.
2. THE ALLEGED STIPULATION \VAS
NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE PROBATE
COURT.
If we assume for the purpose of argument only
that there was a meeting of the minds when the attempted stipulation was stated into the record, an
analysis of the facts and pleading will reveal the inrnlidity of the stipulation because it ignores the plain
provisions of the probate code.

The complaint alleged that the deeds which conreyed real estate to Archie, Vera, Mary and Harriet
were void because they were not delivered during the
lifetime of Alice A. M. Carlos and prayed that each
grantee account for rents and profits and that title
be quieted in the administrator. It is apparent that the
deeds were either valid or void. If valid, the estate had
no interest in the property. If void the estate owned
the property and it could not be sold or otherwise
disposed of, except in accordance with the probate
code. If the alleged stipulation was based upon the
assumption that the deeds were void and that the property belonged to the estate it could not be sold to Archie
for $5,000 (which is $5,000 in addition to the $5,000
which Archie had already paid to his sister in accord19

ance with his agreement with his mother, plaintiff'&
Ex. 1 reproduced on page 2 of this brief) without
following the statutory procedure for confirming the
sale of real estate as provided by sections 75-10-1, 7510-2, 75,10-3, 75-10-11, 75-10-16, and 75-10-17, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. The same reasoning applies
to the deeds to Vera, Mary and Harriet. The sales to
Vera and _Mary were for $1, 7 50 each. Each to be
effectual would have had to be confirmed by the order
of the probate court after notice and the offering of
the property for sale in open court to the highest bidder.
If the stipulation is construed as settlement of
claims of the estate the statute clearly requires authorization by the court. See section 75-11-12 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 which provides:

"Compromising with debtors.-Whenever a
debtor of the decedent is unable to pay all his
debts, the executor or administrator, with the
approval of the court or judge, may compound
with him and give a discharge upon receiving
a fair and just dividend of his effects. A compromise mav also be authorized when it appears to
be just ~nd for the best interests of the estate."
This is not a case in which all interested parties
have agreed to ignore statutory procedure, and in which
all elements of notice and hearing required by law
have been considered. Gladys Fixel and Norma Parker
were not parties to the suit or to the stipulation, and
obviously not bound by the judgment. The stipulation
is not valid because the plaintiff as administrator had

20

no authority from the probate court to make the stipulation. 'Ve shall discuss under another heading the
lack of jurisdiction of the court to approve the stipulation.
3. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID.

It is well settled law that a court may approve
and act upon a stipulation for the entry of judgment
if it has jurisdiction of the parties and general jurisdiction of the subject matter.
30 Am. J ur. 254

However, it is equally well settled that consent
of. the parties cannot bestow validity on stipulated deerees beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
86 A.L.R. 88

Jurisdiction has been defined as :
"The right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in the given case. To constitute this
there must be three essentials: First, the court
must have cognizance of the class of cases to
which the one to be adjudicated belongs; second,
the proper parties must be present; and third,
the point decided upon must be, in substance
and effect, within the issue; 'Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 268, 11 Sup. Ct. 773, 35 L.Ed
464.' Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 1760.
This court discussed the essentials of jurisdiction
in the case of Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha
v. Bragg, 67 Utah 60 at p. 81, 245 P. 966, and coneluded as follows:
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"It is fu.nda1:11ental .th~t .a .petition or pleading
of some kmd is the Jus1d1cial means of invest.
mg a court with jurisdiction of subject matter
to adjudicate it, and a judgment which is beyond
or is not supported by pleadings must falL Su
too must a judgment or sequestrating order fall
for other errors of law apparent on the face of
the mandatory record, such as showing the judgment obtained to be at variance with the prac·
tice of the court or contrary to well-recognized
principles and fundamentals of the law. A fact
apparent from the mandatory record showing
that fundamental law was disregarded in the
establishment of the judgment, will render it
null and void for all purpose. And a judgment
founded upon such a record is subject to direct
and collateral attack, and will sua sponte, be
noticed by the courts and acted upon by them
without regard to the wishes or relation of the
parties named upon the record. In other words,
all proceedings must appear to be coram judice.
The views herein expressed are not at variame
with the cases. (Citing many cases)."
In the present case the alleged stipulation for all
practical purposes settled an estate without all neces·
sary parties present or represented, without statutory
notice, petition or hearing of the matter of sales of
real estate and without statutory notice, petition or
hearing of the matter of distribution of the estate. The
stipulation ignores the fundamental law and is at variance with the practice of the courts. Under the cases
and statutes cited and discused above the alleged stipu·
lation is void. As indicated under the preceding heading
the withdrawal of consent by Archie, (if he ever gave
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it) before entry of the judgment voided any attempted
stipulation.
4. THE FINDINGS AND ORDER

ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
At the hearing on the motion to vacate the judgment, Archie and Mrs. Carlos were the only witnesses
who testified, and their testimony that Archie had not
authorized his attorney to agree to a settlement which
required payment by him of another $5,000 is not contradicted. Likewise, the testimony of Archie that he had
had only a fifth grade education, had never been in court,
and did not know what a stipulation was at the time of
the trial is likewise not contradicted. When the court
asked Archie if he agreed to the stipulation he evaded
and finally said "I guess." With respect to this statement
it may have been intended to mean that he guessed he
had to move the silo. He did not understand about
waiving his claim against the estate. It is pretty clear
that he did not know what "waive" meant. This testimony with nothing to the contrary in the record clearly
indicates entire lack of support for findings Nos. 4,
5 and 6.
"rith respect to finding No. 7 the complaint alleges
failure to deliver the deeds and seeks the quieting of
title in the estate. The answers to Archie, Mary and
Glenn deny non-delivery and pray for dismissal. No
counterclaim for quieting title in them was filed. Vera,
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with plaintiff's counsel as her attorney, filed no answer
but filed a cross-complaint against Archie confessed
non-delivery and alleged that the deed to Archie
was void beca"se the deceased was acting under
duress and un<lue influence. It is apparent that there
was no support in the pleadings for quieting title
in the grant:oes named in the questioned dPeds, divicling up money in certain bank accounts, ~ <l playin~·, fast and loose with the probate code-which :ncludes either confirming the sale of estate property without notice or hearing, settling claims without authority, or distributing the estate without notice or hearing.
Finding No. 7 finds no support in the record.
Finding No. 8 is a conclusion of law and it is
clearly erroneous. Where a party to an alleged stipulation withdraws his consent before the judgment is
entered, he is not bound, especially where as here it
was contemplated when the statement was made in court
that a written stipulation will be filed. The law with
respect to withdrawal has been discussed above and
will not be repeated here.
Finding No. 10 is not supported by the evidence.
The file in the probate proceeding in the matter of
the estate of Alice A. M. Carlos, No. 1722, is in evidence. It discloses no order authorizing the prosecution
of the suit nor the entry of the alleged stipulation.
Finding No. 11 is a conclusion of law which is
entirely erroneous. This proceeding is authorized by
Rule 60b, which permits a motion to vacate a judg24

mcnt upon the grounds that it is void or that it should
be rncated in the interest of justice without a time limitation. The time for appeal had already expired before
Archie knew about the entry of jud~ment. He first
found out about it about February 6.., 1966. See the
April 19 transcript, p. 26.
CONCLUSION

lu view of the obivous lack of a meeting of the
minds respecting the alleged oral stipulation, the lack
of education, experience and understanding of Arch;e,
his withdrawal of consent (if indeed any had been
given) by refusal to sign the written draft of stipulation before the entry of judgment, the judgment
should be set aside and Archie should have his day
in court on the merits of the case. Also, as a matter
of law, a stipulated judgment which purports to
either sell estate property, compromise a claim or
distribute an estate with total disregard of statutory
probate procedure is void and the order denying the
motion to set aside the judgment should be reversed
and a trial of the case on the merits should be directed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. J. SKEEN
522 Newhouse Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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